Aquarights Ico Review

Aquarights Ico Review – Digitizing Water Rights

About Aquarights

Aquarights vision is to capitalize on recent technological advancements in the digitization of assets with a particular focus on water rights. They envision an alternative to the traditional capital markets made possible by the ability to create a new class of digital assets. A White Paper will provide readers with clear insight into your strategy for the implementation of decentralized ownership of digital assets backed by a physical store of wealth.

Blockchain technology is the optimal solution for the decentralized exchange of value and creation of digital assets. Blockchain technology also creates a secure, less expensive and efficient method to exchange ownership of digital assets on a global scale. Bitcoin was the first blockchain digital asset. The popularity of Bitcoin illustrates that digital assets have become an alternative asset for investors.

Aquarights Key Information

Token NameAquarights
ICO start25th Sep 2017
ICO end10th Oct 2017
Distributed in ICO70%
Tokens for sale7,000,000
Token SymbolALV
Token TypeERC20
Price in ICO0.3700 USD
WhitepaperClick Here For View Whitepaper
WebsiteClick Here For Visit ICO Homepage

The Game Change Team Behind Aquarights

Aquarights Ico Review - Digitizing Water Rights

Protocol overview

In this section Aquarights present an overview of the Aquarights protocol. They will discuss how your chosen parameters enable system security in Section 5. Throughout the description below, Solvers and Verifiers who deviate from protocol by broadcasting malformed data or failing to respond within timeout bounds forfeit their security deposits to the jackpot repository. They shall see in Section 5.3, the Solver lacks incentive to claim the same jackpot more than once, hence the Solver’s self-verification does not spoil other Versifier’ motivation to participate.

Sanity check

The table on the next page recaps the parameters used in the Aquarights protocol and hints at how to estimate their exact values. Each parameter is either a fixed constant, an input from a participant or something already on the blockchain, or can be computed from the elements which appear above it in the table. By inspecting the list below from top to bottom, one can
confirm that all notions are well-defined. In such situations, they expect the Solver to challenge his own “mistake” and receive a jackpot payout much greater than reward. Aquarights makes this payout automatic since the Solver would lose the verification game anyway if he and Verified were to play it out.

Pairwise Sybil attacks

In a Sybil attack, an adversary assumes multiple identities on the network in order to execute an exploit. Identities on Aquarights include Task Givers, Solvers, Versifier, Judges, and Referees. By our assumption (Section 2.3), Judges and Referees always function as intended, and they provide additional justification for this axiom here. In this subsection, they consider all sets of pairs among the remaining identity types and show that pairwise cooperation does not harm operation of the system. While parties can freely join and leave Aquarights, each identity must make a deposit in order to participate. This deposit alone is a general deterrent against Sybil attacks, however as they shall see, multiple identities do not provide much cheating advantage.

Solver and Verifier

In certain situations it is conceivable that a Solver–Verified pair could benefit from submitting a false solution and then challenging it due to temporal constraints external to Aquarights itself (as mentioned in Section 4.3), and in such cases the Task Giver must determine the necessary deposits to deter such actions. In the case of an forced error, they expect the Solver will challenge himself in order to win the jackpot. Nevertheless, Aquarights tax rate (Section 4.2), and hence its jackpot payout (Section 4.1), suffices to incentivize an independent Verified to also check the solution.

The Solver’s burned deposit always exceeds the Versifier income for successfully challenging an unforced error (see Section 4.3). Hence the Solver has no incentive to challenge himself as a Verified in such cases. Similarly, a Verified can only lose her deposit by posing bogus challenges.